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What’s the Right Rent?





Purdue University Cooperative Extension Service • West Lafayette, Indiana
Introduction
Three factors have caused significant changes in the
economic environment for farm operators and land-
owners.
First, farmers observed record corn and wheat
prices in 1996 and near record soybean prices in
1997. These prices were much higher than most
persons would have predicted two years ago. In
November, 1997 farmers could sell 1997, 1998, and
1999 crops at prices higher than in 1994. Prices above
1994 levels are expected until prospects materialize
for increased year-end carry-over supplies.
Second, given the changes in government policies,
increased price variability is likely for the foreseeable
future. The 1996-97 price changes are an example of
increased price variability. During the last half of
1996, prices for 1997 harvest varied 50 cents per
bushel for corn and $1.50 per bushel for soybeans.
That’s a revenue variation of $65 per acre for aver-
age-yielding Indiana cropland.
Third, over the next five years, most farmers expect
to receive government payments. Farmers who signed
up for this program know the amount of their pay-
ment, which differs by year and will gradually
decline.
How are landlords and tenants affected by this new
economic environment? What are the likely conse-
quences under different types of operating arrange-
ments? What new features might appropriately solve
new or old problems for either or both parties? This
publication considers these questions.
Since increased price variability is forecast for the
foreseeable future, more landlords and tenants may be
interested in conventional share leases, perhaps with
provisions for privilege payments to better match
the rent to the current price level. In addition, there
may be interest in including terms in cash leases
which adjust rents to account for changes in crop
prices and also for changes in yields, costs, and
government programs.
Budgeted earnings for 1998, as expressed by per-
acre contribution margins, are significantly higher
than budgeted earnings for three years ago.Some
tenants may be willing and able to make a cash
payment to landlords for the privilege of having an
otherwise conventional share lease.
Besides wanting to adjust cash leases for changes
in costs, yields, prices, and government program
payments, some tenants and some landlords may
want these adjustments to be based on outside-the-
farmgate benchmarks other than on the tenant’s
actual production and marketingperformance.
When using such adjustors, landlords may be
more willing to consider lower skilled prospective
tenants and tenants who may plant and/or harvest
their farm late in the season when yields are ex-
pected to be lowest. Highly skilled tenants may also
prefer using outside-the-farmgate adjustors because




The question of who gets the government payment
is not raised elsewhere in this publication. Why?
The payment is just another source of revenue. As
such, it is added to corn sales and soybean sales in
the calculation of per acre contribution margin. The
1 The author acknowledges the contributions of J.H. Atkinson, Mike Boehlje, Chris Hurt, Bob Jones, Marshall Martin, and Wally Tyner.




corn payment is calculated by multiplying the FSA
yield x .85 x payment rate x acres of corn base. The
corn payment rate is estimated as follows: 1998,
$0.36; 1999, $0.35; 2000, $0.32; 2001, $0.26; and
2002, $0.25.
Present tenants and landlords may wish to discuss
this question. But, if given the opportunity to bid for
the farm in a rental auction, prospective tenants
would bid the government payment into the rent.
Price Effects
Higher Prices
The most immediate and evident change in the
economic environment in 1996 was higher crop
prices. Tables 1-3 illustrate the impacts of these
higher prices and other changes on what we will call
“contribution margin.” This term is simply the
difference between sales revenue and variable costs.
One could think of the contribution margin as
representing returns per acre to machinery, manage-
ment, labor, and land. Hence, it is the amount of
expected returns to be allocated in any operating
arrangement.
Actual prices for 1997 crops may be lower than
actual prices for 1996 crops. However, from Tables
1-3, it is clear that the expected returns as measured
by contribution margin are still higher for 1998
crops. The percentage changes vary by type of soil,
but the changes are large under any conditions and
are largest for the highly productive soil. As shown
on Table 1 for the low yield soil, the budgeted
contribution margin increased $42 from 1995 to
1998. On the average soil, the budgeted contribution
margin increased $52 from 1995 to 1998. On the
high yield soil, the budgeted contribution margin
increased $61 from 1995 to 1998.
1Source: Doster, D.H., et al., Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166. Variable costs include seed, fertilizer, fuel, repairs, hauling, crop insurance,
misc., and interest on variable costs. The year-to-year increase in variable costs reflects inflation and also slightly higher expected
yields.
2Source: Chicago Board of Trade November 15 prices for November beans and December corn 12 months later, less local harvest basis
for central Indiana elevator; beans, $0.25; corn, $0.20.
3Author estimates. The 1995 corn deficiency payment was estimated @$0.45 per bushel X 90 bushel ASCS yield X .775x base acres with
the base acres at 50% of the tillable acres=$31/acre of corn base or $413 per acre of set-aside. On November 15, 1996, there was no
farm program for 1996. The new farm program of April 1996 provided for a payment based on $0.25 per bushel x .85 of the FSA yield of
90 bushels=$20/acre or $10/acre increase, not included in the rotation contribution margin for 1996. The 1997 payment is based on
$0.46 per bushel x .85 of the FSA yield of 90 bushels=$38. The 1998 payment is based on $0.36 per bushel, etc.
4Contribution margin (CM) is the returns to machinery, labor, management, and land.
5Rotation contribution margin is the contribution margin per tillable acre assuming all tillable acres are in a corn/soybean rotation with
a 1995 corn base of 50% (and 7.5% set-aside in 1995 only).
Table 1.  Per Acre Budget Summary, Eroded Miami Type Soil
Corn/Soybean Rotation, Owner Operator
Budgets Prepared November 15, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Crops




snaeB nroC snaeB nroC snaeB nroC snaeB
dleiY 1 6.301 2.33 8.401 5.33 9.501 9.33 1.701 3.43
ecirP 2 03.2$ 17.5$ 75.2$ 73.6$ 05.2$ 35.6$ 36.2$ 07.6$
selaS 832$ 091$ 962$ 312$ 562$ 122$ 282$ 032$
tnemnrevoG 3 314$ 53 82
euneverlatoT 832$ 314$ 091$ 962$ 312$ 003$ 232$ 013$ 032$
stsocelbairavsseL 1 021 02 97 221 08 421 28 421 38
nigramnoitubirtnoC 4 811$ 393$ 111$ 741$ 331$ 671$ 931$ 681$ 741$
noitubirtnocnoitatoR
nigram 5
521$ 041$ 851$ 761$
3
Table 2. Per Acre Budget Summary, Crosby Type Soil
Corn/Soybean Rotation, Owner Operator
Budgets Prepared November 15, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Crops
1Source: Doster, D.H., et al., Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166. Variable costs include seed, fertilizer, fuel, repairs, crop insurance, misc.,
and interest on variable costs. The year-to-year increase in variable costs reflects inflation and also slightly higher expected yields.
2Source: Chicago Board of Trade November 15 prices for November beans and December corn 12 months later, less local harvest basis
for central Indiana elevator. Beans, $0.25; corn, $0.20.
3Author estimates. The 1995 corn deficiency payment was estimated @ $0.45 per bushel X 110 bushel ASCS yield X.775x base acres
with the base acres at 50% of the tillable acres=$38/acre of corn base or $507 per acre of set-aside. On November 15, 1995, there was
no farm program for 1996. The new farm program of April, 1996 provided for a payment based on $0.25 per bushel x .85 of the FSA
yield of 110 bushels-$23/acre or $11/acre increase, not included in the rotation contribution margin for 1996. The 1997 payment is
based on $0.46 per bushel X .85 of the FSA yield of 110 bushels=$43/acre. The 1998 payment is based on $0.36 per bushel, etc.
4Contribution margin (CM) is the returns to machinery, labor, management, and land.
5Rotation contribution margin is the contribution margin per tillable acre assuming all tillable acres are in a corn/soybean rotation with
a 1995 corn base of 50% (and 7.5% set-aside in 1995 only).
Break-Even Prices
Was your rent right for 1995?  After also consider-
ing cost increases and normal trend yield increases,
how much would prices need to fall to put you in a
break-even situation with your 1995 budget?  For the
average-yielding soil situation represented in Table 2,
1998 harvest prices would need to fall to $2.29 for
corn and to $5.35 for beans.
If you were to also recognize higher machinery
replacement costs in 1998 versus 1995, the break-
even prices would be about $2.34 for corn and $5.50
for beans.
Particularly on low-quality land, 1995 leases may
not have provided the tenant with sufficient funds to
replace his machinery and also cover his labor costs.
Therefore, do not necessarily use your 1995 lease as a
benchmark for making adjustments for future years.
Impacts of Changes on Different
Operating Arrangements
Changes in expected returns and perceived changes
in risk will affect operating arrangements in different
ways. For example, changes in contribution margin
will affect cash rent and share rent differently.
The impacts of changes in returns are pretty clear
for the owner operator and custom farming alterna-
tives. For each $1 change in expected and in realized
contribution margin, the owner operator receives the
entire $1, as shown in Table 4. In the owner operator
situation, the landlord and tenant are the same, and
the increase accrues to the owner operator. In custom
farming, the landlord is contracting with the farmer to
do the farming operations. The landlord bears all the
risk and receives all the gain or loss from a change in
economic conditions.




snaeB nroC snaeB nroC snaeB nroC snaeB
dleiY 1 3.821 14 7.921 5.14 4.131 9.14 6.231 4.24
ecirP 2 03.2$ 17.5$ 75.2$ 73.6$ 05.2$ 35.6$ 36.2$ 07.6$
selaS 592$ 432$ 333$ 462$ 923$ 472$ 943$ 482$
tnemnrevoG 3 705$ 34 43
euneverlatoT 592$ 705$ 432$ 333$ 462$ 273$ 472$ 383$ 482$
stsocelbairavsseL 1 831 02 09 141 09 441 39 441 49
nigramnoitubirtnoC 4 751$ 784$ 441$ 291$ 471$ 822$ 181$ 932$ 091$
noitubirtnocnoitatoR
nigram 5
361$ 381$ 402$ 512$
4
1Source: Doster, D.H., et al., Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166. Variable costs include seed, fertilizer, fuel, repairs, hauling, crop insurance,
misc., and interest on variable costs. The year-to-year increase in variable costs reflects inflation and also slightly higher expected
yields.
2Source: Chicago Board of Trade November 15 prices for November beans and December corn 12 months later, less local harvest basis
for central Indiana 100 car unit train elevator:  beans, $.25; corn, $.20.
3Author estimates. The 1995 corn deficiency payment was estimated @ $.45 per bushel X 135 bushel ASCS yield X.775x base acres with
the base acres at 50% of the tillable acres = $47/acre of corn base or $627 per acre of set-aside. On November 15, 1995, there was no
farm program for 1996. The new farm program of April, 1996 provided for a payment based on $.25 per bushel x .85 of the FSA yield
of 135 bushels = $29/acre or $15/acre increase, not included in the rotation contribution margin for 1996. The 1997 payment is based
on $.46 per bushel X .85 of the FSA yield of 135 bushels = $53/acre. The 1998 payment is based on $0.36 per bushel, etc.
4Contribution margin (CM) is the returns to machinery, labor, management, and land.
5Rotation contribution margin is the contribution margin per tillable acre assuming all tillable acres are in a corn/soybean rotation
with a 1995 corn base of 50% and 7.5% set-aside.
The allocation of a $1 increase in share leasing
arrangements also is pretty straightforward. The
increase is shared 50/50 between the tenant and
landlord. However, in a dynamic context, a per-
ceived change in economic conditions may lead to
different sharing arrangements. Who pays what
could change if the contribution margin and thus the
implied or theoretical rent changes significantly due
to higher or  lower prices.
For cash rent, the allocation of an unexpected
change in revenue also is straightforward. Since the
cash rent payment was agreed to in advance, the
unexpected revenue increase was not factored into
the rental rate, and the tenant receives the total
increase.
The complicated case is the one we now face—the
expected increase in contribution margin, mainly
because of expected higher prices. The question
marks in Table 4 indicate that we cannot say how the
expected increase will be allocated. It depends on
many factors, including speed of adjustment of
rental terms to changing economic conditions.
For rents to be set now, it can be assumed that the
changes in expected contribution margins in Tables
1-3 can serve as the upper limits for cash rent
changes, as well as the upper limits for changes in
theoretical rents. However, normally actual changes
would be lower, for awhile, at least, on many farms.
Landlords and tenants may perceive that the current
upswing in prices is temporary. They may perceive
that the adjustment costs of moving rent quickly up
and down to reflect the changing conditions are too
high. That is, landlords and tenants may strive for
some notion of “average” rent that is “too high” in
some years and “too low” in others. They may prefer
stability to complicated and potentially stressful
renegotiations every year.
 Table 3.  Per Acre Budget Summary, Brookston Type Soil
Corn/Soybean Rotation, Owner Operator
Budgets Prepared November 15, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Crops




snaeB nroC snaeB nroC snaeB nroC snaeB
dleiY 1 9.951 5.05 6.951 1.15 4.161 6.15 2.361 2.25
ecirP 2 03.2$ 17.5$ 75.2$ 73.6$ 05.2$ 35.6$ 36.2$ 07.6$
selaS 363$ 882$ 014$ 523$ 404$ 733$ 924$ 053$
tnemnrevoG 3 726 35 14
euneverlatoT 363$ 726$ 882$ 014$ 523$ 754$ 733$ 074$ 053$
stsocelbairavsseL 1 551 02 89 261 99 761 301 661 401
nigramnoitubirtnoC 4 802$ 706$ 091$ 842$ 622$ 092$ 432$ 403$ 642
noitubirtnocnoitatoR
nigram 5
412$ 732$ 262$ 572$
5
However, in other cases, either landlords or
tenants may want to adjust cash rents to better reflect
the changed economic conditions. Under these
conditions, some landlords will change lease terms
with their present tenants. Other landlords will
change lease terms and change tenants. Some
farmers will perceive an opportunity to get more
land by bidding higher rents, which is made possible
by the increased returns depicted in Tables 1-3.
There is little doubt that the major changes in
prices will lead to changes in tenancy, rent levels,
and perhaps operating arrangements. It is difficult to
predict how pervasive the changes will be, but
landlords and tenants need to be prepared to factor




Operators differ greatly in their production and
marketing performance, in their ability to bear risks,
and in their preference for bearing risks. Therefore, a
rent that’s right for a tenant for a specific farm may
not be the highest rent a landlord can receive. In a
market economy, better performing tenants will pay
higher rents than poorer performing tenants are able
to pay for comparable land.
Likely, no one characterizes a market economy as
being kind. It is efficient, however, in that people are
likely to use their resources where they have the
greatest comparative advantage.
Better performing tenants get better cropland and
frequently expand the scale of their operations. The
poorest performing tenants exit the industry and use
their resources where they have a comparative
advantage.
Motivation
A landlord has farmland. Prospective tenants have
labor, management skills, machinery, and financing.
The economic or business goal for each party is to
realize the largest return to his resources, i.e., the
largest contribution margin for the lease period.
Closely related economic or business goals for a
landlord might include maintaining or improving the
land for use in future periods, a known amount of
rent paid monthly, or even an operating arrangement
which allows a landlord to participate in changes in
costs, yields, prices, or government programs
without participating in the risks of the operator’s
actual performance.
Landlords may be motivated by other goals. These
include helping a relative or friend, having the farm
look nice, having the snow plowed out of the
driveway, or having a weekend or vacation place.
The landlord chooses which prospective operator to
contract with. Therefore, prospective operators will
want to offer the services the landlord wants.
Landlords regularly offer contracts to prospective
operators who may not pay the landlord the highest




Many tenants currently rent farms from multiple
landlords. Their expected contribution margin may
vary considerably for the different farms they rent.
For example, participants at the  Purdue Top Farmer
Crop Workshop reported expected per-acre contribu-
tion margin differences July, 1997 of $50 between
their most profitable and least profitable rentals. For
various reasons, they had negotiated better deals
with some landlords than with other landlords.
Table 4. Impacts of a $1 Increase in Return
rotarepOrenwO gnimraFmotsuC esaeLerahS05/05 tneRhsaC
esaercninruterdetcepxE









Land is farmed by persons using one of four types
of operating arrangements. The owner operator owns
all the farm resources and is responsible for produc-
ing and marketing the crops. Since only one party is
involved in this operating arrangement, it is not
considered further in this publication.
Custom Farm Arrangement
The custom farm operator is hired by a landowner
to do some or all of the production jobs. However,
the landowner is responsible for purchasing seed,
fertilizer, and chemicals, and for marketing the crops.
In a basic custom farm arrangement, the landowner
assumes all the risks of changes in seed, fertilizer,
and chemical costs, yields, prices, and government
programs. The landowner is dependent upon the
custom operator’s performance in regard to the
timing and effectiveness of field operations. Presum-
ably, the landowner selects a highly skilled operator.
The landowner’s next challenge is to motivate the
operator to do fieldwork at or near the optimum dates
for planting and harvesting. Landowners may offer to
make incentive payments on all work performed on
pre-identified dates.
If the custom operator has his own or cash rented
land to plant, his opportunity cost for doing planting
or harvesting on the best dates is the expected yield
lost, and thus contribution margin lost, from not
doing the work on his own or cash rented land on
those dates, but instead doing his own acres last.
Therefore, the custom operator must calculate
whether he can afford to do the fieldwork on the
custom farm on the best dates. This calculation is
similar to the budgeting the share rent tenant needs to
make as he decides whether to do his own or cash
rent land on the best dates. For both the custom
operator and the share rent tenant, the question is
how can he make more total returns on his resources,
i.e., more contribution margin. If he has to do the
work on the best dates in order to retain the contract,
he will do so as long as the total expected contribu-
tion margin is greater with, than without, the custom
contract.
Share Lease Arrangement
The share arrangement explicitly accounts for how
the contribution margin changes will be shared. For
example, a landlord and a tenant may want to share
equally in changes in total contribution margin which
occur during the lease period. Thus, they choose a
 50/50 share lease.
Conflicting Share Lease Terms
You may have heard the statement, “Landowners
and tenants should share costs and revenue in the same
percentage.” That certainly holds for fertilizer, seed,
and chemicals. In a 50/50 lease, if both parties pay
half of these costs and realize half of the benefits, they
will likely find it easy to agree on how much of each
item to use. If they both use the same input-output
research information, the point where marginal cost
equals marginal revenue is the same for both the
landlord and the tenant.
Recognize, however, that the above statement is
violated in a 1/3 - 2/3 share arrangement where one
party pays for all the seed, fertilizer, and chemicals
and gets only 2/3 of the yield. Theoretically, that party
can’t afford to put on as much fertilizer, etc.
By type of operating arrangement, who can afford to
be most timely with his field work?  The answer is,
the owner operator and the cash rent tenant. They
provide all the labor and machinery and receive all the
crops. The crop share tenant provides all the labor and
machinery and receives only part of the crop.
Cash Rent Arrangement
With the cash rent arrangement, the tenant pays the
landlord for the right to use the farm for a period such
as a year. The landlord may include terms such as
which fields can not be plowed or which fields must
have alfalfa. The landlord may even commit to
applying a set amount of lime, phosphate, and/or
potash each year. However, the tenant generally
decides what crops to raise, what tillage to use, what
seed, fertilizer, and chemicals to purchase, and when
to grow, harvest, and market the crops.
Adjusting the Basic Arrangement
In any operating arrangement, other terms can be
included. Here are some examples for the three basic
arrangements involving two parties.
Adjusting Custom Farm Arrangements
As economic conditions change, changes in dollar
amount are least likely for custom farm arrangements.
Why? The landlord merely needs to negotiate with the
operator to perform the agreed upon jobs. When
economic conditions improve, an operator can realize
higher rewards from being timely on his other farms.




Suppose, however, the budgeted 50/50 lease is not
the right rent for the land in terms of current eco-
nomic conditions. For the given economic environ-
ment, a 50/50 share rent on low-quality, near mar-
ginal land will not provide a tenant with sufficient
funds to replace his machinery and compensate him
for his personal opportunity cost. Such a rental
amount is much more than the landlord can expect to
realize with other operating arrangements. Land is
generally considered the residual claimant for returns.
Machinery replacement cost and personal opportunity
cost, sometimes called labor and management charge,
must be recognized before finding the amount for
theoretical land rent.
A 50/50 share rent is likely not representative of the
right rent on extremely high-quality Indiana land,
either. Why? The landlord’s expected share of the
total contribution margin is much less than the
landlord could realize with custom farm or cash rent
operating arrangements.
Suppose the landlord recognized that the 50/50
share results in a non-economic rent for his farm, but
he still wants to share 50/50 in changes during the
lease period in costs, yields, prices, or government
programs. How can he create the right base rent?
One answer to the question can be developed by
observing past performances of landlords and opera-
tors. On low-quality land, landlords offer to pay
operators for some of the services operators perform,
such as harvesting. On high-quality land, tenants
offer to pay for half the lime, perhaps all the harvest-
ing, hauling, and/or spraying.
Parties can also exchange money in the form of
privilege rent to adjust the rent to economic condi-
tions existing at the beginning of the lease period.
Given the significant changes in economic conditions
that have occurred in the past three years, changes
may occur in terms of 50/50 leases.
In dollar amounts, these changes will be more on
high-quality land than on low-quality land. Why? As
shown in Tables 1-3, total contribution margin has
increased more on high-quality land than on low-
quality land.
Some persons may remember the large number of
tenants who lost their 50/50 leases in the 1973-75
period. What happened? Some 50/50 tenants ne-
glected to offer to pay more privilege rent so as to
adjust their lease to the new economic conditions.
Neighboring prospective tenants offered to pay
landlords significantly higher rents, in the form of
cash rent operating arrangements. Many landlords
accepted these offers. These occurrences illustrate the
point that rents are set by neighboring tenants. In these
instances, landlords had many opportunities for
realizing higher rents.
Adjusting Cash Rents
Landowners who cash rent their farms annually with
the expectation of renegotiating their leases prior to
the beginning of each new lease period likely realize
rents that more nearly reflect theoretical economic
conditions. Of course, some operators reduce their
cash rent bid because they realize the same farm will
be advertised for rent again next year.
Lease adjustments for the next year to recognize
unexpected tenant losses last year are not a part of the
calculation of theoretical rent for next year. Land-
owner costs for mortgage payments or for property
taxes or for family living needs are not a part of the
calculation of a theoretical economic rent. These costs
must be met even if the farm is not rented.
In a cash rent situation, the landlord bears no risk
for changes in variable input costs, yields, prices, or
government programs. The tenant realizes 100% of
the changes which occur after the beginning of the
lease period. Other than concerns about meeting
possible conservation plans, the landlord has no
responsibility for:
a. Deciding what crop, how much seed, fertilizer,
etc., unless specified in the lease.
b. Purchasing variable cost items.
c. Deciding how, where, when to market the
crops.
If the cash rent contract is renegotiated each year,
the amount of the rent is likely to change to reflect
economic conditions when the negotiation occurs.
Terms can also be included to adjust for changes
during the lease period in costs, yields, price, and/or
government program. If no adjustors are included, the
tenant realizes 100% of the changes in total contribu-
tion margin. As illustrated in Table 5, if 100% adjust-
ers are included for all four types of changes in
contribution margin, the landlord realizes 100% of the
changes in total contribution margin. The tenant is
then the equivalent of a custom operator, since the
tenant knows the amount of his contribution margin as
soon as the lease terms are agreed upon. If the cost,
yield, price, and government program changes are
shared 50/50, the resulting lease is similar to a 50/50
crop share.
In Table 5, the budgeted total rotation contribution
margin is $204, and the budgeted cash rent is $117. If
8
the landlord accepts 100% of all four outside the
farmgate adjustors, the actual cash rent is $125.
Suppose the parties were to agree to the same
budgeted cash rent, but were to share equally in all
four adjustors. Then, instead of increasing $8, the
cash rent would increase $4.
In Table 6, find the calculations for 1997 for a 50/
50 crop share lease, including both a budgeted and
an actual rotation contribution margin. Note the
budgeted total rotation contribution margin is $204
in Table 5 and Table 6. Note the actual total rotation
contribution margin is $212 in both tables. Note
each party splits the $8 difference in contribution
margin in both tables.
What’s the difference between the numbers in
Table 5 and Table 6? In Table 5, the tenant’s ma-
chinery, labor, and management contribution are
subtracted from the total rotation contribution
margin, leaving the residual as the land rent.
In Table 6, the rotation contribution margin is the
returns to each party’s contribution, i.e., the returns
to each party’s resources. In the Table 6 budget, the
tenant’s contribution margin is $93, as compared to
$87 ($37 for personal opportunity cost + $50 for
machinery) in Table 5. Thus on the average yielding
Crosby soil for 1997, there is not much difference
between the budgeted cash rent and 50/50. However,
as will be illustrated in Table 7 for low productivity
soil, the 50/50 rent budget results in the tenant’s
contribution margin being only $75.
In the Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166, the author uses
$37 for personal opportunity cost and average
annual replacement cost for machinery of $46, $50,
and $55 for the three soil types in 1997 and $2
higher for each soil in 1998. For a 1000-acre farmer,
the $37 per acre for labor is $37,000, perhaps
comparable to an off-farm salary or to a full-time job
paying $18.50 per hour.
Inside specific farmgates, we have fewer resident
operators. With operators farming several farms
each, they increasingly face the challenge of how to
satisfy the timeliness of multiple landlords. In
addition, both tenants and landlords have concerns
about how to best keep track of crop inputs and
production by farm.
Negotiating the right budget amount is important
in both the budgeted cash rent as in Table 5 and the
budgeted share rent as in Table 6. Perhaps landlords
and prospective tenants should consider using a
common budget as they negotiate rental terms. As
discussed later in this publication, a common budget
becomes the benchmark for calculating “outside-the-
farmgate” adjustors for changes in costs, yields,
prices, and government programs.
Perhaps budgeted yields and costs should be for
good operators, not the best performing or worst
performing operator in the area. Then, the best
performing operator will realize extra returns in
addition to those shown in the budget. The worst
performing operator won’t be able to pay the rent,
unless he is somehow subsidizing his crop business.
In Tables 7, 8, and 9, per acre budgeted cash rent,
with no adjustment for the extra price risk, is com-
pared to 50/50 share rent for low, medium, and high
productivity soils for 1998. These calculations are
summarized in Table 10.
Farmers who supply timely conventional tillage
machinery, labor, and management likely expect
more than $75 or they exit the industry when their
machinery wears out. As shown in Table 7 and
summarized in Table 10, on the low-yielding eroded
Miami soil, the tenant realized more returns to his
labor, management, and machinery resources with
the budgeted cash rent contract @ $85 than with the
50/50 share contract @ $75. If the assumptions about
personal opportunity costs and machinery replace-
ment presented in this publication are correct, the
tenant won’t be able to provide for these needs using
a 50/50 share contract on Eroded Miami type soil,
even with corn priced at $2.63 and beans at $6.70.
For the tenant to realize the $85 allowance for labor
and machinery, the landlord needs to pay the tenant
$10.00 or corn prices need to be $.09 higher and
soybean prices need to be $.29 higher.
On the medium-productivity Crosby and high-
productivity Brookston type soils, the tenant realizes
more returns on the 50/50 lease. However, when
expected year-end carry-over supplies increase
significantly, prices will likely fall significantly.
With $2.28 corn and $5.62 bean prices substituted in
Table 8 average yielding Crosby soil, the 50/50
share tenant’s contribution margin is only $75.
For 1998, how much privilege payment, so as to
increase their rent, will landlords ask for on the
Brookston soil?  Note that the landlord gets $181 as
budgeted cash rent versus $148 as 50/50 share rent.
Refer again to question marks in Table 4. How
much is the extra price risk in the cash rent contract?
Landlords and prospective tenants negotiate this
value when they agree on their lease types and terms.
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Table 5.  1997 Per Acre Cash Rent Calculation, Crosby Type Soil,
Budgeted Rent Versus Rent Adjusted for Costs, Yields, Prices, and Government
1 The actual prices are the average Chicago Board of Trade futures closing prices for November, 1997 beans and December, 1997
corn on the last two Wednesdays in October, 1997 and the first two Wednesdays in November, 1997 less basis of $0.25 for beans and
$0.20 for corn.
2Based on estimates used in the Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166 by Doster, D.H., et.al.
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Establishing  Rental Terms
Landlords and prospective tenants use various
procedures as they create their expectations about
likely costs, yields, prices, and government program
payments for their farms.
The information in the following paragraphs is
written as if it pertains only to cash rents. However,
the same procedures can be used for share rents.
Suppose, for example, a landlord decides to have
tenants bid for the lease on his farm as described
later. Suppose the landlord wants a share lease with
the tenants paying a privilege rent in addition. The
landlord can write the terms for the share lease in his
bid announcement and then ask tenants to bid the
amount of privilege rent they are willing to pay in
addition to the rent the landlord receives via the
share rent terms.
Asking Procedure
One way both landlords and prospective tenants
can estimate likely rent is to ask other landlords the
amount of rent they are receiving and to ask other
tenants the amount of rent they are paying. To
discover local rental rates and terms, also ask
Extension educators, lenders, professional farm
managers, and rural appraisers.
Advantages of this procedure include:
1.  It’s simple. There’s no need to estimate costs,
yields, or prices.
Table 6.  1997 Per Acre 50/50 Crop Share Rent Calculation Crosby Type Soil
Budgeted Rent Versus Actual Rent
2.  It’s typical for the community. A comparable
rent for comparable property appears to indicate
the market clearing price for use of this real
estate for the terms of the lease.
Disadvantages of the asking procedure include:
1. By asking different parties, landlords and
tenants may get different estimates of the typical
rent. Leases between family members or other
favored parties may have much lower rents than
otherwise found in the market.
2. A typical rent will lag behind current eco-
nomic conditions. Why? Some persons seldom
change the terms in their lease. Therefore, when
their rents are averaged with persons who do
change lease terms as economic conditions
change, the resulting rental amount will be
different than if only rents negotiated to reflect
current conditions were included.
3. Persons who set their rents according to
average rents will always be behind the current
situation. This lag may not be perceived to be
serious in stable economic times. In highly
variable times or when a major change in
economic conditions occurs, this lag may not be
as acceptable either to landlords or to tenants.
4. The subject farm may not be typical for the
community. If rental terms in a community tend
to be similar regardless of soil quality, field size,
location, etc., the rent will tend to reflect the
productivity of the typical farm. The resulting
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rent on low-quality land will likely be too high.
On high-quality land, the resulting rent will
likely be too low when compared to rent based
on the way described next.
Budgeting Procedure
A second way landlords and tenants negotiate rent
is to create a base or benchmark budget of expected
contribution margin using expected costs, yields,
prices, and government programs.
Advantages of this procedure include:
1. Assuming the numbers are realistic, it reflects
current economic conditions.
2. Once a base budget is agreed upon by both
parties, it can be easy to keep current by recog-
nizing changes in costs, yields, prices, and
government payments.
Disadvantages of the budget procedure include:
1. Landlords and tenants, even if knowledgeable
about current economic conditions, may dis-
agree on what number to use. For example, both
Table 7. 1998 Per Acre Budgeted Rent, Eroded Miami Soil1
Cash Rent and 50/50 Crop Share
Corn/Soybean Rotation
parties may know about expected yields by soil
type on the farm as estimated by USDA NRCS
(formerly SCS) professionals. Based on many
informal farmer surveys it appears that the range
of farmer skills causes at least a 15-bushel corn
yield variation between the next-to-best and
next-to-worst farmer in any community on the
same soil type. Landlords may want to use the
yields, costs, and sales prices of the best farmers.
Prospective tenants, particularly those tenants
who are not the best performers, may want to use
lower yields, higher variable costs, and lower
sales prices.
The problem associated with this budget procedure
can be solved. To re-emphasize points made earlier
in this publication, consider the following state-
ments. If the budget is for expected performances by
a good tenant, the best tenants will be able to realize
extra contribution margin returns to their resources.
Conversely, poor tenants will have to pay more rent
than implied by their performance. Unless they
1 Based on estimates used in the Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166 by Doster, D.H., et al.
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Table 8. 1998 Per Acre Budgeted Rent, Crosby Soil1
Cash Rent and 50/50 Crop Share
Corn/Soybean Rotation
somehow subsidize their crop operation, poor
tenants will be forced to exit the industry when they
are unable to replace their machinery.
When prices for the budget year change greatly in
just a few days, expected contribution margins and
thus the residual rents change greatly. Therefore,
unless one party is assuming 100% of the price
change, the amount of the rent will vary greatly,
depending on the futures prices on the date the base
rent is calculated.
Bidding Procedure
A third way landlords can determine rent is to ask
prospective tenants to bid for the lease. Landlords
can indicate the tillage and crop for each field, as
well as other terms they want in the lease. Landlords
can choose between an auction and a sealed bid
negotiation. With the sealed bid negotiation, land-
lords can more easily pick a tenant they like.
Advantages for having tenants bid for the lease
include:
1. The resulting rent presumably reflects current
economic conditions in the community.
2. By including terms in the bid announcement,
there is no need for further negotiation.
Disadvantages include:
1. Considerable skill and time may be required
to create an appropriate bid announcement.
2. Partly because it’s not yet a common practice,
some prospective tenants may not bid. Others
may not offer competitive bids.
3. Even though the landlord controls the terms of
a lease until it is signed, the landlord must find a
suitable tenant who agrees to the terms.
Changing Rental Terms
Landlords have various options for changing rents.
These include the following.
First, a lease can be written to continue on, say, an
annual basis, until either party gives appropriate
notice to terminate. An advantage of this lease is that
it is simple. A disadvantage of this lease is that the
terms in the lease may soon no longer reflect current
economic conditions. This disadvantage may be of
more concern when economic conditions are more
variable than when they are more stable.
1 Based on estimates used in the Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166, by Doster, D.H., et al.
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Table 9. 1998 Per Acre Budgeted Rent, Brookston Soil1
Cash Rent and 50/50 Crop Share
Corn/Soybean Rotation
Table 10. 1998 Per Acre Budgeted Cash Rent and 50/50 Share Rent
Eroded Miami, Crosby, Brookston Type Soils
Corn/Soybean Rotation
1 Based on estimates used in the Purdue Crop Guide, ID-166, by Doster, D.H., et al.
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A second method for providing for changes in
lease terms is to identify some standard or represen-
tative number and change the lease as this number
changes. Three examples of this method are cited
next.
The USDA reported state average rent is one such
standard. Both parties to the lease might agree that
their rent changes as the reported state average rent
changes. An advantage of this lease term is that it is
simple.
Disadvantages of this lease term include:
1. The number will lag current economic condi-
tions because some rents included in the state
average have not changed for many years.
2. Local economic conditions may change
differently from other areas of the state, and thus
the state average rent will not reflect local
changes in current economic conditions.
Another standard could be the expected contribu-
tion margin budget described above. Given an
agreed-upon base budget, the parties can agree to
change the cash rent or the privilege rent in a share
budget to reflect changes in costs, yields, prices,
and/or government payments.
Finally, changes in the base rent can be made to
reflect changes in costs, yield, prices, or government
payments that occur outside-the-farmgate. Because
this procedure is potentially quite useful, it is
described in more detail.
Cash Rent Adjustors Based on
Outside-the-Farmgate Measures
In a cash rent situation, adjustors for cost, yield,
price, and government program change can be
included without considering the operator’s actual
performance. Why might this be done?  First, it can
be quite simple to create and monitor, as illustrated
in Table 5. It can quickly reflect changes in eco-
nomic conditions, thus reducing the pressure on
either party to terminate the lease.
Second, the landlord may not want to worry about
monitoring the operator’s actual performance. The
landlord may not want to be dependent on the
operator’s decisions about when, where, how to
purchase seed, etc., or when to plant or harvest or
when, where, how to market the actual crops. The
landlord can avoid these concerns by using measures
collected outside-the-farmgate to estimate the
changes in costs, yields, prices, and/or government
programs.
Third, the tenant may not want to be pressured by
the landlord about when, where, how to buy inputs,
produce, and market the crops. The tenant may
appreciate the opportunity to make these decisions for
both this rented farm and other farms he operates
without having to satisfy landlords regarding when
work is done on each farm. Highly skilled operators
may prefer to receive 100% of the benefits of their
work, while not risking the changes of outside-the-
farmgate effects of costs, yields, prices, and govern-
ment programs.
In this situation, the operator is similar to a custom
operator in that he knows the amount of his contribu-
tion margin supplied by the landlord. His situation is
different from a custom operator’s because he also
gets to realize 100% of any outstanding performance
over and above what’s happening outside the farmgate
in terms of costs, weather, prices, and government
payments, and over or under what’s included in the
budgeted rent.
To effect this type of lease, the following adjustors
are representative of ways to account for these
changes.
•  For variable costs, landlords can use the percent-
age change during the lease period in the USDA index
of prices paid by farmers.
•  For yields, landlords can use the percentage
change in USDA published county average yields
during the lease periods.
•  For prices, landlords can use Chicago Board of
Trade next year November beans and December corn
futures prices at the time the lease is negotiated, less a
normal harvest basis for a local elevator, and then
adjust prices by the amount of the price change at the
same elevator during harvest.
•  For government program, only a slight change is
expected after the lease is negotiated because pay-
ments are now known through 2002. Since different
amounts will be paid each year, the rent can be
adjusted accordingly.
Partly to reduce risk and partly to simplify their
management, operators may prefer to have different
operating arrangements on the several farms where
they produce crops. By understanding the implications
of each arrangement, the operator increases the
likelihood of presenting either a present or a prospec-
tive landlord with the arrangement that best fits the
landlord while also allowing the operator to maximize





When should the original rent budget be revised?
The answer is whenever one party thinks something
in the rent budget needs to be revised. This revision
could occur during the summer of the last year of a
lease period.
At that time, one party might request a change in
the percentage of one or more of the adjustors he
will assume in the new lease period. Also, one party
might request a change in the kind and/or amount of
the variable cost items included in the rent budget.
As long as both parties think the correct variable
cost items are included in their present rent budget,
the costs for these items can be changed using the
year-to-year percentage change in the USDA index
for input prices paid by farmers.
Initially, the parties might agree to automatically
include the correct annual government payment
amounts already announced for the years through
2002. The parties might also agree to automatically
increase the expected yields in the budget and to
increase the budgeted fertilizer amounts accordingly.
Suppose both parties agree to use the USDA
reported county yields to set the actual farm yields.
Suppose they agree on the expected yield for the
county and for the farm. Suppose they agree on the
expected annual increase for the county and for the
farm.
Suppose for 1998, they decide the expected county
yields are 125 bushels for corn and 40 bushels for
beans and the expected farm yields are 132.6 bushels
for corn and 42.4 bushels for beans. Suppose they
agree that both the county and the farm annual yield
increase will be 1.1% per year for both beans and
corn. These amounts are used in Table 11 to calcu-
late expected yields for 1998, 1999, and 2000.
Once they learn the actual county yields, they can
fill in the actual yield section as in Table 11. To find
the percentage change between actual and expected
yield, divide the actual yield by the expected yield
for the county. Then to find the actual yield for the
farm, multiply this percentage by the expected farm
yield.
If both parties share in any price adjustment which
occurs after the base budget is calculated, price
changes will be only partly reflected in the final rent
calculation. In this situation, both parties may agree
to use prices on a pre-specified date, or dates, such
as the average of last two Wednesdays in October
and the first two Wednesdays in November each
year to calculate the final rent for that year.
Making the Final Adjustments in the Rent
Suppose a lease is made using the outside the
farmgate adjustors discussed in this paper. Partial
rent payments can be made as agreed to by the
parties. When can the final rent be determined?
1. Government payments are now known
through 2002.
2. Actual harvest prices will be known in the
fall.
3. The USDA Index of Annual Input Price
Changes will be available the next April.
4. County yield reports, published the next May,
will likely be the last information to  become
available.
After considering this information, parties might
decide to make a final rent settlement during the
following summer. At that time, they can also
consider making any changes in their lease.
Summary Statement on Outside-the-
Farmgate Rent Adjustors
Earlier, it was stated that some landlords and
tenants hesitate to change rental terms for a number
of reasons, including the complexity and stress of
frequent negotiations. A simple, almost automatic,
way to adjust rents both during the lease period and
between lease periods is described in this publica-
tion. Once the initial terms are agreed upon, the
lease can continue until one party wishes to change
something. While the negotiations likely will require
considerable effort initially, the effort to monitor
performance will be quite small.
This publication includes more precise calcula-
tions than generally used in the leasing process.
Why? We now have more precise information about
soil types and expected yields. Also, we now have
more information about costs, future market prices,
and government payments. Spreadsheets can be
written for doing the budgeted rent calculations.
A landowner may want or need to keep a tenant
but not want to share in his actual performance. The
parties could be friends, but the landowner is con-
cerned that the tenant’s performances are not as
productive as some other tenants in the area. The
parties could create a satisfactory budgeted rent and
then share in the outside-the-farmgate changes.
Having an outside-the-farmgate adjustor lease
might reduce tensions in a number of family-related
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landlord-tenant cases. On the one hand, the land-
owner can deal effectively with perceived below-
average tenant performance as described in the
previous paragraph. On the other hand, a superior
performing tenant may prefer the outside adjustor
lease because he gets 100% of his performance.
As is true with all leases, the significant negotia-
tions occur prior to the signing of the lease. With
this lease, changes in economic environment and
much of the farm’s weather conditions if you use
county average yields, can be reflected automatically
within the current lease period.
Many tenants can satisfy many landlord concerns
by offering leases which include a budgeted cash
rent with outside-the-farmgate adjustors as agreed to
by both parties. Once leases are in place, tenants can
operate their various rental farms as if they were one
unit. They can plant and harvest each field on the
dates that maximize the tenant’s contribution
margin.
Many landowners can benefit from reduced stress
of not worrying about when the operator is planting
or when he is going to harvest, or when the crops
should be sold.
In Conclusion
Now is an exciting time! Many leases will be re-
written, and many rental farms will change operators
in the coming months.
Tenants and landowners who plan to make
changes in their leases for next year should take
appropriate measures to ensure that both parties
understand that the current lease or lease terms will
not continue in effect.
In new leases, both landlords and tenants may
want to consider using outside-the-farmgate adjus-
tors to account for changes in costs, yields, prices,
and government payments. These terms can be
simple to create and to monitor. The landlord does
not need to worry about the operator’s actual perfor-
mance, and the operator does not need to feel
pressured to plant or harvest this farm on the best
plant/harvest date. Finally, outstanding operators
may prefer to receive 100% of the benefits of their
work, while not risking the changes of outside-the-
farmgate effects of costs, yields, prices, and govern-
ment programs.
Landlords, do you want to negotiate new leases for
next year? Give your present tenants the first oppor-
tunity to rent the farm again. While you’re doing
these things, get your lease in writing.
Tenants, if you want more land, this is a good time
to offer a prospective landlord a higher rent and/or
better services than he now has. You might want to
reduce your risk. Offer to pay higher base or current
rent except include adjustors for some or all of the
actual changes in costs, yield, price, and/or govern-
ment programs.
If you want to keep your present farm, do your
budgeting homework, make an appointment with
your landlord, and get your lease signed for next
year as soon as possible.
Table 11. Expected and Actual Corn and Soybean Yields, 1997,1999
Expected Annual Yield Increase: Corn 1.5 Bushels; Beans, .5 Bushels
Example County and My Farm
 Cooperative Extension work in Agriculture and Home Economics, state of Indiana, Purdue University, and U.S. Department of Agriculture
cooperating; H. A. Wadsworth, Director, West Lafayette, IN. Issued in furtherance of the acts of May 8 and June 30, 1914. The Cooperative
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